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Third-Party Standing and Abortion Providers: 
The Hidden Dangers of June Medical Services 
Elika Nassirinia* 
ABSTRACT 
Standing is a long held, judicially-created doctrine intended to establish the proper 
role of courts by identifying who may bring a case in federal court. While standing usually 
requires that a party asserts his or her own rights, the Supreme Court has created certain 
exceptions that allow litigants to bring suit on behalf of third parties when they suffer a 
concrete injury, they have a “close relation” to the third party, and there are obstacles to 
the third party's ability to protect his or her own interests. June Medical Services, heard 
by the Supreme Court on June 29, 2020, involves the Unsafe Abortion Protection Act, a 
Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers (TRAP) law which requires abortion providers 
in Louisiana to have admitting privileges at a hospital within thirty miles of where the 
providers perform abortions. This law decreased the number of abortion clinics in 
Louisiana from six to three. In addition to the admitting privileges issue in the case, 
Louisiana challenged the entitlement of the plaintiff-providers to third-party standing in 
bringing suit, arguing that abortion providers do not meet the requirements of third-party 
standing. Louisiana’s arguments pose a grave danger to reproductive rights across the 
country, as the abolishment of third-party standing for abortion providers would severely 
restrict the number of cases brought forth challenging abortion restrictions. Louisiana’s 
arguments ignore a long line of precedent that recognizes third-party standing of abortion 
providers challenging health and safety regulations, as well as the well-documented 
dangers of TRAP laws to women’s health. In addition, Louisiana’s rationale rests on 
inaccurate assumptions about the dynamic between abortion providers and their patients, 
and disregards the very real and dangerous hindrance in the path of women seeking to file 
lawsuits on their own behalf in cases involving abortion restrictions. 
INTRODUCTION 
2019 brought some of the strictest abortion bans in recent American history, 
including bans in Alabama, Georgia, and Missouri.1 While these bans garnered national 
attention and outrage, a less well-known case threatens the foundations of reproductive 
rights across the country. June Medical Services v. Gee is the first abortion case taken up 
 
* J.D. Candidate, Northwestern Pritzker School of Law, 2021. I am grateful to Professor Deborah 
Tuerkheimer whose class and guidance inspired this Note, as well as Professor Len Rubinowitz, whose 
dedication to teaching about the law as a tool for social change has been a source of inspiration for the past 
three years. I would like to thank the staff of the Northwestern Journal of Law and Social Policy for their 
thoughtful edits, and my family and friends for their support throughout the process. 
1 K.K. Rebecca Lai, Abortion Bans: 9 States Have Passed Bills to Limit the Procedure This Year, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/us/abortion-laws-states.html. 





by the Supreme Court since Justices Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh, two of Donald 
Trump’s appointees, took the bench.2  
 June Medical involves the Unsafe Abortion Protection Act (Act 620), a bill 
requiring abortion providers to have admitting privileges at a hospital within thirty miles 
of where the providers perform abortions.3 On June 12, 2014, the Governor of Louisiana 
signed the Act into law, effective September 1, 2014.4 After the passage of Act 620, the 
number of abortion clinics in Louisiana decreased from six to three, severely impacting 
women’s5 access to abortion services in the state.6 Abortion providers in Louisiana, 
including Hope Medical Group for Women, filed suit, arguing that the Act threatened their 
and their patients’ procedural and substantive due process rights, and seeking injunctive 
relief.7 
The law at issue in June Medical is strikingly similar to the law overruled in Whole 
Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt.8 Both Whole Woman’s Health and June Medical involve 
Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers (TRAP) laws, which impose particularly 
stringent requirements on abortion providers not required of other medical providers.9 
These laws, passed under the pretense of protecting women’s health and safety, 
substantially restrict access to abortion, “add nothing to existing patient protections,” and 
allow “hospitals effective veto power over whether an abortion provider can exist.”10 
Specifically, some TRAP laws, like Act 620 in June Medical, mandate that providers 
performing abortions have relationships with local hospitals, requirements that have 
negligible benefits for patient care but set nearly impossible standards for providers to 
meet.11  
While the admitting privileges issue of June Medical has garnered public attention, 
the quieter and less glaring third-party standing challenge presented by the state of 
Louisiana presents significantly more widespread and devastating potential for damage to 
reproductive rights. Louisiana filed a cross-petition challenging the entitlement of the 
litigants—in this case Hope Clinic as well as two physicians—to third-party standing in 
 
2 Leah Litman, How the Court Could Limit Abortion Rights Without Overturning Roe, THE ATLANTIC 
(Oct. 8, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/10/how-june-medical-services-v-gee-could-
restrict-legal-abortion/599560/. 
3 June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Gee, 905 F.3d 787, 790 (5th Cir. 2018). 
4 June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Gee, 814 F.3d 319, 321 (5th Cir. 2016). 
5 While this Note refers to individuals impacted by abortion restrictions as “women,” it is important to note 
that individuals identifying with any gender may seek abortions and be impacted by abortion restrictions. 
6 June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Kliebert, 250 F.Supp.3d 27, 36 (M.D. La. 2017). 
7 June Med. Servs. L.L.C., 814 F.3d at 321–22. The plaintiffs in this case consist of abortion providers in 
Louisiana, including Hope Medical Group for Women, Bossier City Medical Suite, and Causeway Medical 
Clinic, as well as two physicians. Id. at 319. “John Doe 1 is a physician in Family Medicine and Addiction 
Medicine who performs abortions at Hope Clinic and has not obtained admitting privileges within thirty 
miles of Hope. John Doe 2 is an obstetrician-gynecologist who performs abortions at Bossier and 
Causeway. Doe 2 has not obtained admitting privileges within thirty miles of Bossier but has obtained 
conditional privileges at a hospital within thirty miles of Causeway.” Id. at 321 n.2. 
8 Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2297 (2016). 
9 Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers (TRAP), CTR. FOR REPROD. RTS. (Aug. 28, 2015), 
https://reproductiverights.org/document/targeted-regulation-abortion-providers-trap. 
10 Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers, Guttmacher Institute (Dec. 1, 2020), 
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/targeted-regulation-abortion-providers. 
11 Id. 
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bringing suit.12 Louisiana argues that abortion providers do not meet the requirements of 
third-party standing because their interests are at odds with those of patients; they do not 
have a “close” relationship with patients that resembles traditional doctor-patient 
relationships; and there is no absolute hindrance to the ability of third-parties, women 
seeking abortions in this case, to bring suit on their own behalf.13  
The Court has no basis for denying third-party standing to abortion providers in this 
case. A long line of cases before June Medical established that abortion providers are 
entitled to third-party standing in suits that impact the reproductive choices of their 
patients, and that the traditional doctor-patient relationship is different than that developed 
in other professional relationships.14 In June Medical, the State argues that the traditional 
doctor-patient relationship does not exist between patients and abortion providers at all.15 
This argument ignores the Court’s history of having long revered and protected the doctor-
patient relationship, a history which suggests that if other individuals are privy to third-
party standing in their professional relationships, this standing is even more warranted for 
abortion providers.16 The attempt to deny abortion providers third-party standing is a thinly 
veiled attempt to restrict the right to an abortion without overruling Roe.17 The denial of 
third-party standing will turn the constitutional right to an abortion into a mere formality, 
quietly devastating reproductive rights as we know them.  
In Part I, this Note examines third-party standing criteria. Part II analyzes the three 
challenges to third-party standing for abortion providers laid out by Louisiana in its 
conditional cross-petition and demonstrates that they are neither supported by law nor 
evidence. Lastly, Part III provides a picture of the consequences that will arise if the Court 
agrees with Louisiana by ruling that providers do not have third-party standing to bring 
cases on behalf of their patients.18 
I. STANDING 
A. Procedural History of Third-Party Standing 
Standing is a long-held, judicially-created doctrine intended to establish the proper 
role of courts by identifying who may bring a case in federal court. The doctrine emerges 
from Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement, which grants the federal courts “[t]he 
judicial power of the United States” and limits this power to hearing “cases” and 
“controversies.”19   
 
12 Conditional Cross-Petition, Gee v. June Med. Servs. L.L.C., (No. 18-1460), 2019 WL 2241856. 
13 Id. at *22.  
14 See e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 444 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 
(1965).  
15 June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020). The case was decided on June 29, 2020. Id. In 
a 5-4 decision, the Court found Act 620 to be unconstitutional, as it posed an undue burden and placed a 
substantial obstacle in the path of women seeking an abortion. Id. 
16 See e.g., Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973). 
17 Roe, 410 U.S. 113. 
18 June Med. Servs. L.L.C., 140 S. Ct. 2103. 
19 U.S. CONST art. III, § 2. 





In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Court clarified the requirements necessary for 
standing.20 First, the plaintiff must have suffered an ‘“injury in fact’—an invasion of a 
legally protected interest” which is “concrete and particularized . . . and actual or imminent, 
not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’”21 In other words, the injury must be clear and specific, 
as opposed to a mere possibility. Second, there must be a causal connection between the 
injury and the conduct in question.22 The injury must be “fairly . . . trace[able]” to the action 
of the defendant, rather than resulting from the action of a third party not before the court.23 
Finally, it must be “likely,” as opposed to “speculative,” that the injury will be remedied 
by a favorable court decision.24 
Standing usually requires that a party asserts his or her own rights. However, the 
Court has created certain exceptions for third parties. To establish third-party standing, a 
litigant must first have suffered an “injury in fact”—a specific, concrete injury as opposed 
to a hypothetical one—giving the individual a tangible interest in the outcome of the matter 
in question.25 Second, the litigant must have a “close relation” to the third party.26 
Third, there must be an obstacle to the third party's ability to protect his or her own 
interests.27  
B. Third-Party Standing in June Medical 
In June Medical, Louisiana argues that the litigants in the case, Hope Clinic and two 
physicians, do not have third-party standing to bring suit because abortion providers do not 
meet the requirements of third-party standing.28 Before addressing the merits of 
Louisiana’s argument against granting third-party standing, it is important to note that in 
considering precedent, this issue should have been waived. Act 620 is strikingly similar to 
the Act in Whole Woman’s Health, which was found unconstitutional, to the extent that the 
District Court in June Medical actually invalidated Act 620 as facially unconstitutional in 
light of the Whole Woman’s Health ruling.29 Given that the entirety of Louisiana’s 
argument hinges on the constitutionality of Act 620, an act incredibly similar to legislation 
the Supreme Court found to be unconstitutional in Whole Women’s Health, the issue of 
Act 620’s constitutionally should have been waived as the act was now unconstitutional on 
its face.  
In Whole Woman’s Health, the Court found that two provisions in Texas House Bill 
2 (HB 2) were unconstitutional.30 The first provision required that physicians performing 
abortions have admitting-privileges at a hospital no further than thirty miles away from the 
abortion facility on the day of the procedure, decreasing the number of clinics providing 
 
20 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Other cases examining the issue of standing 
include Spokeo, Inc. v. Robbins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1546 (2016); Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 
398, 408 (2013); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). 
21 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 561. 
25 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411 (1991). 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Conditional Cross-Petition, supra note 12. 
29 June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Kliebert, 250 F.Supp.3d 27, 35 (M.D. La. 2017).  
30 Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2297 (2016). 
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abortions in Texas from forty-two to nineteen.31 The second provision required that the 
center meet the standards for an ambulatory surgical center.32 The Court in Whole Woman’s 
Health ruled that both provisions of HB 2 placed a “substantial obstacle” in the path of 
women seeking abortions and constituted an “undue burden,” rendering the requirements 
unconstitutional.33  
While the District Court in June Medical found Act 620 facially unconstitutional in 
light of Whole Woman’s Health, the Fifth Circuit reversed the decision, finding that Act 
620 did not “impose a substantial burden on a large fraction of women,” rendering it 
constitutional.34 Louisiana objected to the granting of third-party standing to providers for 
the first time almost five years into litigation, and only after the Supreme Court granted 
plaintiffs’ emergency application to stay the Fifth Circuit’s decision finding Act 620 
constitutional.35 The timing of Louisiana’s argument is suspicious because it asks the Court 
to conduct a de novo review of evidence “cherry-picked” from the extensive trial record.36 
Louisiana’s arguments against granting third-party standing were not analyzed in lower 
courts, and the District Court found no facts supporting the state’s objections to providers’ 
standing, ruling that Louisiana’s arguments on this point failed.37 In addition, federal courts 
have already thoroughly investigated the issues raised in this claim.38 While all of these 
factors suggest the third-party standing objection should be subject to waiver, this Note 
will assume that the state has not waived this issue.  
II. LOUISIANA’S CHALLENGE 
Louisiana makes three challenges to the third-party standing of abortion providers in 
June Medical. Louisiana first argues that the plaintiffs’ interest “conflict[s]” with those of 
their patients because the plaintiffs’ interest is to reduce the number of regulations on 
abortion while providing “as many abortions as possible.”39 Second, Louisiana argues that 
the relationship between the providers and their patients lacks the sufficient “closeness” of 
a traditional doctor-patient relationship, and is thus nonexistent.40 Third, Louisiana argues 
that there is no evidence of a “hindrance” to women seeking abortions to represent 
themselves in these cases and bring suit.41 
A. Conflict of Interest 
In June Medical, Louisiana argues on behalf of Act 620. Act 620 requires abortion 
providers to have admitting privileges at a hospital within thirty miles of where the 




33 Id. at 2298. 
34 June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Gee, 905 F.3d 787, 805 (5th Cir. 2018). 
35 Opposition to Conditional Cross-Petition, Gee v. June Medical Services, (No. 18-1460), 2019 WL 
2241856, at *8.  
36 Id. 
37 Id. at *9. 
38 Id. 
39 Conditional Cross-Petition, supra note 12 at *25. 
40 Id. at *22. 
41 Id. 





from six to three, severely restricting women’s access to abortion services.42 The plaintiff-
providers in this case are abortion providers in Louisiana who argue that the Act is 
unconstitutional, and threatens their and their patients’ procedural and substantive due 
process rights, while Louisiana asserts that Act 620 is constitutional.43  
Louisiana first claims that plaintiffs’ interests as abortion providers conflict with the 
interests of their patients.44 Louisiana argues the plaintiff-providers’ interest is to reduce 
the medical providers’ “present and future compliance obligations” and provide “as many 
abortions as possible,” whereas patients primarily have an interest in safety by getting an 
abortion from doctors with admitting privileges at a hospital within thirty miles of where 
the providers perform abortions.45 Louisiana argues that adopting Act 620 would improve 
the quality of patient care and protect women’s health, leading physicians to adopt a level 
of care higher than they “would otherwise provide.”46 This argument assumes not only that 
abortion is an inherently risky procedure, but that the level of care provided to patients is 
inadequate and will further degrade without state intervention. However, study after study 
has revealed that abortion is an extremely safe medical procedure that carries little or no 
risk of “fertility-related problems, cancer or psychological illnesses,” and that TRAP laws, 
such as Act 620, and other regulations, presented under the guise of protecting the health 
and safety of women, compromise women’s access to abortions without actually increasing 
the safety of the procedure.47 Louisiana argues that doctors and patients have an inherent 
conflict of interest concerning health and safety regulations, a conflict that exists regardless 
of the merits of how much Act 620 serves patient health and safety.  
Louisiana’s rationale rests on inaccurate assumptions about the doctor-patient 
dynamic. First, the assumption that doctors and patients have a conflict of interest regarding 
health regulations is logically flawed. Physicians are bound by ethical guidelines that 
require them to prioritize the health and safety of their patients.48 In addition, the district 
court found that in the decades before the passage of Act 620, abortion in Louisiana was 
“extremely safe,” and that this safety was reflected in the records of the clinic and two 
physicians who brought suit in this case.49  
 
42 June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Kliebert, 250 F.Supp.3d 27, 36 (M.D. La. 2017). 
43 June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Gee, 814 F.3d 319, 321–22 (5th Cir. 2016). 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at *25. 
46 Id. 
47 Heather D. Boonstra, Rachel Benson Gold, Cory L. Richards & Lawrence B. Finer, Abortion in Women’s 
Lives, Guttmacher Institute (2006), https://www.guttmacher.org/report/abortion-womens-lives (“Induced 
abortion in the United States is now an extremely safe procedure; injuries and deaths from abortion are 
rare.”). See also Mads Melbye, Jan Wohlfahrt, Jorgen H. Olsen, Morten Frisch, Tine Westergaard, Karin 
Helweg-Larsen & Per Kragh Andersen, Induced Abortion and The Risk of Breast Cancer, 336 NEW 
ENGLAND J. MED. 81-85 (1997) (Finding no link between abortion and breast cancer.); News Release, The 
Quality of Abortion Care Depends on Where a Woman Lives, Says One of Most Comprehensive Reviews of 
Research on Safety and Quality of Abortion Care in the 
U.S., NAT’L ACADS. SCIS., ENG’G & MED. (Mar.16, 2018), http://www8.nationalacademies.org/onpinews/n
ewsitem.aspx?RecordID=24950 (Finding that having an abortion does not increase a woman’s risk of 
“secondary infertility, pregnancy-related hypertensive disorders, preterm birth, breast cancer, or mental 
health disorders such as depression, anxiety, or post-traumatic stress disorder,” and that “abortion-specific 
regulations” create barriers to “safe and effective care.”). 
48 Code of Medical Ethics Overview, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION (2019), https://www.ama-
assn.org/delivering-care/ethics/code-medical-ethics-overview. 
49 June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Kliebert, 250 F.Supp.3d 27, 35 (M.D. La. 2017).  
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY  [2021 
 
 220 
In addition, TRAP laws are damaging. A 2016 study in Critical Public Health found 
that laws such as Act 620 damage patient care, harm which providers must then work to 
minimize.50 Researchers focused on providers in North Carolina after the passage of House 
Bill 854 (HB 854), a TRAP law that mandated patients receive counseling with state-
determined information as well as a twenty-four-hour waiting period between counseling 
and the procedure.51 Researchers found that most providers made changes not only to meet 
HB 854’s legal requirements, but also to “minimize the burden of the law” on patients.52 
Providers chose to implement measures that eased the difficulties posed by HB 854 on their 
patients, but required the providers themselves to perform substantial amounts of “invisible 
labor” in order to minimize this burden.53  
Providers offered telephone counseling rather than requiring multiple clinic visits, a 
measure that, although beneficial for patients, imposed considerable financial, time, and 
labor costs for providers.54 Some practices hired additional staff while others extended the 
hours of existing staff to meet demands, with one physician choosing to take calls at all 
hours of the day, even while at home, to facilitate patient access.55 Providers described 
working more uncompensated hours to meet the law’s requirements, and physicians 
performed work not typically taken on by those in their profession, such as answering 
phones and making appointments for patients.56 In addition, providers generally absorbed 
both the financial and time burden of these changes, without increasing their prices for 
patients to compensate for the additional costs.57 Providers stated that passing the financial 
burden onto patients would have been “not fair” or “unkind,” given that patients already 
struggled to pay for these procedures.58  
The study concludes that TRAP laws harm patients, but also suggests that providers 
place patient care above their own interests. Not only do providers not hold interests that 
conflict with those of their patients, but they act as barriers between their patients and the 
harms created by laws such as Act 620, thus revealing that their interests are far more 
aligned with their patients’ than Louisiana suggests. Many providers in the study also 
described feeling emotionally burdened by the law due to their concern that it was “harmful 
to women.”59 Providers felt frustrated that the regulation was “unnecessary,” “irrelevant,” 
and led them to balance compliance with the law’s requirements against their commitment 
to provide high quality, responsible medical care.60 The conflict of interest described by 
Louisiana is not between providers and their patients, but the combined interest of patients 
and providers against laws that jeopardize reproductive care and safety.  
In addition, studies have repeatedly shown that TRAP laws such as Act 620 hold no 
benefits for patient safety. In a recent study analyzing induced abortions among 49,287 
 
50 Rebecca J. Mercier, Mara Buchbinder, Amy Bryant, TRAP Laws and the Invisible Labor of US Abortion 
Providers, 26 CRITICAL PUB. HEALTH 1, 2 (2016). 
51 Id. at 5.  
52 Id. 
53 Id.  
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 6. 
56 Id.  
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 7. 
60 Id. 





women, researchers found that performance of the abortion in an ambulatory surgery center 
compared to an office setting was not associated with a significant difference in morbidity 
and adverse events,61 demonstrating that many “safety” regulations are unsupported by 
science. Therefore, even if providers have interests different from their patients, TRAP 
laws do nothing to protect patients’ interests or to keep them safe in the face of supposedly 
dangerous, irresponsible providers. In addition, by impeding women’s access to abortion, 
TRAP laws delay the procedure, causing women to face greater medical risk than they 
would have had they been able to access the procedure earlier.62 Though abortion is 
extremely safe at any point during pregnancy, the risk of complications from abortion 
increases later in pregnancy, with the risk of death associated with abortion rising from 0.3 
deaths for every 100,000 abortions at or before eight weeks to 6.7 deaths at 18 weeks or 
later.63 TRAP laws not only fail to increase patient safety, but endanger patients. 
Professional duties and standards aside, a somewhat cynical line of reasoning further 
demonstrates that physicians have no reason to be at odds with regulations that truly protect 
the health and safety of their patients. As with many other professions, a physician’s 
professional reputation is vital to the financial success of her practice.64 Physicians benefit 
professionally from complying with regulations that protect the health and safety of their 
patients, not out of the goodness of their hearts, but out of a desire for financial success. 
Perhaps the resistance of providers to these regulations is evidence that the regulations do 
nothing for the health and safety of the women they proclaim to protect.65  
In addition, Louisiana’s argument ignores a long line of precedent that recognizes 
third-party standing of abortion providers challenging health and safety regulations, as 
petitioners demonstrate in their response to the cross-petition.66 In Planned Parenthood of 
Central Missouri v. Danforth, the Supreme Court found that physicians had standing to 
challenge an abortion ban that imposed criminal liability on providers for failure to comply 
with regulations such as requiring spousal support or parental consent for minors, defining 
fetal viability, and requiring reporting and recordkeeping of patients from physicians and 
clinics.67 In City of Akron, the Court allowed physicians to challenge a health regulation 
that required second trimester abortions to be performed in hospitals.68 And, in Doe v. 
Bolton, the Court allowed physicians to bring suit on behalf of their patients to challenge 
laws that required abortions to be performed at accredited hospitals for the supposed health 
 
61 Sarah C. M. Roberts, Ushma D. Upadhyay, Guodong Liu, Jennifer L. Kerns, Djibril Ba, Nancy Beam & 
Douglas L. Leslie, Association of Facility Type with Procedural-Related Morbidities and Adverse Events 
Among Patients Undergoing Induced Abortions, 319 JAMA 2497, 2501 (June 26, 2018). 
62 Suzanne Zane, Andreea A. Creanga, Cynthia J. Berg, Karen Pazol, Danielle B. Suchdev, Denise J. 
Jamieson & William M. Callaghan, Abortion-Related Mortality in the United States: 1998–2010, 126 
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 258, 260 (Aug. 2015). 
63 Id. at 262. 
64 Jonathan Catley, A Doctor's Reputation Means Everything: How to Protect Yours, MD CONNECT (Sep. 
30, 2014, 1:40 PM), https://www.mdconnectinc.com/medical-marketing-insights/bid/76854/A-Doctor-s-
Reputation-Means-Everything-How-to-. 
65 Mercier, supra note 50. 
66 Conditional Cross-Petition, supra note 12.  
67 Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 62 (1976).  
68 City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 434 (1983) (“There can be no 
doubt that § 1870.03's second trimester hospitalization requirement places a significant obstacle in the path 
of women seeking an abortion. A primary burden created by the requirement is additional cost to the 
woman.”). 
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of women, again revealing the Court’s receptivity to allowing abortion providers third-
party standing.69  
 Lower courts have also found providers to have third-party standing when bringing 
suit on behalf of their patients, generally rejecting the conflict of interest theory presented 
by Louisiana. In Abbott, the Fifth Circuit, to which Louisiana also belongs, rejected a 
conflict of interest challenge to an admitting privilege law.70 The Ninth Circuit in 
McCormack rejected a conflict of interest argument built upon a lack of commitment from 
physicians to patient safety.  This argument is directly presented in June Medical, where 
Louisiana both asserts that health regulations are at odds with the interests of providers, 
and subsequently attacks the safety record, commitment, and qualifications of providers.71 
The Seventh Circuit, in Charles, rejected the argument that a conflict of interest existed 
between patients and providers because abortion regulations were created to protect women 
from “abusive medical practices,” finding providers were sincerely concerned about the 
wellbeing of their patients.72 And perhaps most succinctly, in Planned Parenthood of 
Wisconsin, the Seventh Circuit asserted that the interests of providers and patients are the 
same because women who want abortions are seeking the same thing clinics are seeking.73 
Ultimately, Louisiana’s claim that the interests of patients and abortion providers are at 
odds holds no basis and has been explicitly rejected in past decisions. 
B. Closeness in Relationship 
 Louisiana next claims that abortion providers are not entitled to third-party standing 
because they lack the “close relationship” with their patients that is traditionally found in 
doctor-patient relationships.74 Louisiana’s claims follow a long-standing trend of 
governmental actors treating abortion providers with distrust and barely-concealed 
disgust.75 Historically, society has not considered these providers real doctors, instead 
viewing them as “abortion doctors” who will harm women and trick them into undergoing 
abortions unless the state steps in and protects women from the providers’ greedy, 
untrustworthy hands.76 Louisiana claims this, in the face of overwhelming evidence that 
abortion is incredibly safe and that providers inform women of their options and in no way 
pressure them to have abortions. Regardless, Louisiana argues abortion providers and 
patients do not have a “close relationship,” contending that the nature of the relationship 
 
69 Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188 (1973) (“The physician is the one against whom these criminal statutes 
directly operate,” and, therefore, faced a “sufficiently direct threat of personal detriment” to justify 
standing.). 
70 Planned Parenthood of Greater Texas Surgical Health Services v. Abbott, 748 F.3d 583, 586–87 (5th Cir. 
2014). 
71 McCormack v. Herzog, 788 F.3d 1017, 1022 (9th Cir. 2015). 
72 Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d 772, 775 (7th Cir. 1980). 
73 Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786, 788 (7th Cir. 2013). 
74 Conditional Cross-Petition, supra note 12, at 22. 
75 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1614 (2007); Solomon Posen, The Doctor in Literature: 
The Abortion and the Abortionist, HEKTOEN INT’L J. MED. HUMAN. (2011), 
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between abortion providers and patients is wholly different than that of a traditional doctor-
patient relationship.77 This bias is clear in Louisiana’s description of the work of abortion 
providers as those who Louisiana says “perform very brief procedures on drugged patients 
whom they never saw before and will never see again.”78  
Yet, abortion providers, like physicians in every other field, consult with their 
patients, explain their patients’ options, inform their patients about the procedures and the 
related risks, and make themselves available for any questions or concerns after the 
procedure has been completed. The safety of abortions perhaps lessens the patient’s need 
to contact her doctor after the procedure. Additionally, the nature of abortions, in which 
the need for them often only arises in the event of an unplanned pregnancy, renders 
significant advanced planning or numerous prior physician meetings unworkable and 
unnecessary. Yet, neither the safety nor nature of abortions take away from the doctor-
patient relationship.  
The relationship between emergency medicine doctors and their patients, for 
example, despite its similarities to women and abortion providers, is societally considered 
a valid doctor-patient relationship. Many women do not openly speak about their abortion, 
due to the persistent social stigma around abortion, as well as the threat of facing 
harassment if others become aware of their decision. Instead, many women underreport 
and intentionally misclassify abortion procedures, which results in further misconceptions 
about the prevalence of abortion, to the extent that only 35%-60% of actual abortions are 
reported in surveys.79 This sets the procedure apart from other, even significantly more 
dangerous procedures, such as childbirth or an organ transplant, because societally, these 
other procedures are not frowned upon or frequently met with shame or secrecy. As such, 
a woman seeking an abortion reasonably trusts her provider to deliver medical care rising 
to the doctor-patient level. Even more, she trusts her provider to perform perhaps the most 
stigmatized medical procedure in American society safely, expertly, and without judgment. 
She places her trust in her provider at a time when she is vulnerable to judgment and stigma, 
strengthening the doctor-patient bond.   
In addition, abortion providers face a significant toll, demonstrating that these 
individuals are so dedicated to providing patients with care that they are willing to make 
significant personal and professional sacrifices. Many providers experience “career 
burnout,” face harassment by anti-choice individuals, have their occupation and role as 
physicians questioned and demeaned by society at large, are presented with constant 
restrictions that impede their ability to provide healthcare, and sometimes are berated for 
their professional roles by the very patients who seek and gladly accept their services.80 
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From 2010 to 2018, abortion providers nationwide reported 471 cases of vandalism, 2,826 
cases of trespassing, 108 cases of assault and battery, and 259 death threats.81 During these 
years, providers experienced a total of 3,991 instances of violence, in addition to 406,733 
instances of disruption, revealing the constant stream of threats, harassment, and violence 
abortion providers face as a result of the much needed service they provide.82 Not only do 
these providers face violence and harassment, they are also met with professional stigma, 
both by patients and colleagues. In a 2012 study analyzing attitudes regarding the 
legitimacy of the work of abortion providers, providers reported feeling “looked down 
upon” by patients and medical colleagues and being judged as “deficient,” both “morally 
and technically.”83 In addition, providers reported feeling that colleagues viewed them as 
occupying the “low ground” on the moral plane of medicine and “less technically 
competent” than doctors who make different career choices.84  
Despite attempts by the anti-choice movement to vilify abortion providers, these 
providers endure danger, exhaustion, and a lack of professional regard in order to provide 
their patients with safe and confidential healthcare during a time when patients are 
particularly vulnerable. If the “traditional doctor-patient relationship” means anything, it is 
the willingness of the physician to place her patient’s health, safety, and well-being above 
all else, ethical regulations permitting. Abortion providers have demonstrated this, even in 
the face of harassment, threats to their lives, and a repeated unwillingness for their 
professional capability and trustworthiness to be taken seriously. Their willingness to file 
suit on behalf of their patients, individuals who, given statistics regarding women most 
impacted by TRAP laws, often lack the time, resources, or physical capacity to file suit 
themselves, suggests that abortion providers not only meet the standards of the traditional 
doctor-patient relationship, but exceed it, thus satisfying the “closeness” requirement for 
third-party standing.85 
 Perhaps most importantly, Louisiana’s definition of closeness is at odds with how 
the Court has defined such a relationship. The Court has traditionally found that a close 
relationship exists when the enforcement of the law in question against the litigant would 
be “indirectly in the violation of third parties’ rights.”86 In Roe, the seminal abortion case 
in United States history, the Court found that the Due Process Clause of the 14th 
Amendment provides a “right of privacy” that protects a woman’s right to have an abortion, 
a right that is balanced against the state’s interest in preserving a woman’s health as well 
as its interest in potential life.87 The impact of Act 620, however, is directly at odds with 
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the right established in Roe to safe, legal abortions for those who seek them within limited 
time frames.88 Enforcement of Act 620 against providers would drastically restrict 
women’s access to abortion. The district court found that Act 620 would result in a 
“substantial” number of women being denied access to abortion and “delays in care” that 
would increase complications, as well as “unlicensed and unsafe abortions.”89 Louisiana’s 
claim that abortion providers and patients do not share a “close” enough relationship for 
third-party standing thus does not hold merit. 
 Interestingly, Louisiana claims that plaintiffs are mere “vendors of abortion 
services.”90 Louisiana attempts to distinguish this case from myriad others asserting that 
vendors of products and services, due to the economic impact of regulations, have third-
party standing to assert the rights of their customers. In Craig v. Boren, the Supreme Court 
held that beer vendors had third-party standing to assert the equal protection rights of their 
customers, who faced differences in whether they could purchase near-beer, a beverage 
with a lower alcohol content than beer, based on their age.91 Louisiana, however, asserts 
that it is a “long step” from an ordinary vendor protecting the rights of his customers to a 
doctor “representing a patient’s interest in safety,” when the patient is making one of the 
“most ‘grave’” decisions she could ever make.92 In effect, Louisiana attacks abortion 
providers’ relationship with their patients by suggesting providers are only vendors, thus 
refusing them status as doctors, while also refusing providers the third-party standing 
afforded to vendors to sue on behalf of their customers. If abortion providers were 
considered vendors, their interests would be at odds with those of their patients, suggesting 
that they do not have a close doctor-patient relationship. Yet, Louisiana cannot frame 
abortion providers as vendors, because courts have categorically granted third-party 
standing to vendors asserting the rights of their consumers.  
Courts traditionally grant vendors, including pharmaceutical companies, beer 
manufacturers, lottery ticket sellers, and gun manufacturers third-party standing due to the 
economic injury they will suffer as a result of regulations.93 The language in these decisions 
indicates that when a regulation has substantial impact on the vendor, he or she is granted 
third-party standing. There are three requirements for third-party standing to be granted to 
a vendor. First, the regulation must be one that is particularly directed at a vendor; second, 
it must require the vendor to make significant changes in his or her everyday practices and 
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to incur a “direct economic injury” against the vendor; and third, it must expose him or her 
to “heavy economic injury” or “loss of license” for failure to comply.94  
As previously discussed, TRAP laws such as Act 620 are not only directed at abortion 
providers but force abortion providers to change their everyday practices and incur 
economic harm as a result of these changes. In addition, providers are exposed to heavy 
penalties for failure to comply with these regulations, penalties which satisfy precedent’s 
requirements for a vendor to hold third-party standing in challenging a regulation due to 
economic injury.95 As such, abortion providers should have third-party standing to 
challenge TRAP laws such as Act 620 due to economic injury alone, invalidating 
Louisiana’s claim that providers lack standing because they are “vendors” of abortion 
services.96 Not only have economic injuries proven sufficient for parties to establish third-
party standing, but non-economic injuries for “professional,” “aesthetic,” “social,” and 
“political” harm have similarly proven enough.97 The fact that providers clearly suffer 
economic injuries as a result of TRAP laws, and suffer injury to their professional lives as 
a result of these restrictions, strengthens providers’ claim to third-party standing.  
 In addition, courts grant medical professionals third-party standing in a manner they 
have not granted to individuals in other professions, such as lawyers, suggesting that this 
standing is particularly favored for physician-patient relationships.98 Louisiana’s claim is 
further undermined by a line of cases that recognize the role of providers as both vendors 
and health professionals.99 These cases found no issue with the coexistence of economic 
stake and the doctor-patient relationship that would warrant a denial of third-party standing 
for abortion providers.100  If anything, the combined role of providers as both vendors and 
individuals privy to a close, confidential relationship with their patients renders them more 
entitled to third-party standing than those in any other profession. 
C. Hindrance 
Lastly, Louisiana argues that there is no evidence of a “hindrance” in the path of 
women seeking abortions to represent themselves in cases involving abortion 
restrictions.101 Of all well-publicized abortion cases since the legalization of abortion, Roe 
is the only case brought by a pregnant woman alone (instead of by abortion providers or a 
team of the woman and providers).102 Roe formalized the right to an abortion.103 Therefore, 
it makes sense that Roe was brought by a single petitioner seeking an abortion, and later 
cases were brought under the abortion rights Roe granted to providers and women. Notably, 
the case took several years, and by the time it was decided, the plaintiff had already given 
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birth and in-turn was denied the opportunity to get an abortion.104 Pregnant women, in 
particular, face challenges that make filing cases on their own incredibly challenging. 
These include the lengthiness of the process, made especially glaring given the limited 
timeline of pregnancy, as well as the knowledge and resources it takes to bring forth a legal 
challenge.  
In Louisiana, the number of abortion clinics decreased from six to three after the 
passage of Act 620.105 The reduction in abortion clinics dramatically increased the distance 
some Louisiana women were forced to travel to obtain an abortion, making the procedure 
unfeasible for women who did not have the means to travel such distances or receive time 
off from work.106 This burden on women reveals the dangers of TRAP laws that are not 
challenged before or immediately after they go into effect. While the decrease in abortion 
clinics may suggest that more women may be willing to sue, given how severely their 
access to abortion has been limited, the women most affected by Act 620 presumably do 
not have the resources to sue and likely are placed under added stress due to the increased 
difficulty of attaining care. The poorer these women the greater difficulty they will have in 
reaching the three available clinics, suggesting that unless providers step in on behalf of 
these women, they will continue to suffer without the opportunity to realistically advocate 
for themselves. 
TRAP laws also disproportionately impact certain women due to race and economic 
status, rendering particular groups of women even more vulnerable in the absence of third-
party standing.107 A study tracing the number of abortions per 1,000 women between 2014–
2017 revealed vast disparities across individuals seeking abortions based on race as well 
as income level.108 In 2017 alone, about 27 per 1,000 black women had abortions, compared 
to approximately 18 Hispanic and 10 white women, revealing that women of color seek 
abortions at significantly higher rates than white women.109 The study also revealed steep 
differences among women seeking abortions based on income level, finding that in 2017 
alone, 49% of abortion patients fell below the federal poverty level, while 26% of patients 
fell one to two times above the federal poverty level.110 Thus, stripping providers of third-
party standing will not only hinder all women seeking abortions, but will especially harm 
women of color and low-income women—groups already marginalized due to centuries of 
racism and income disparity.   
The groups of historically marginalized women most directly impacted by TRAP 
laws also face barriers to suing on their own behalf. While these women have fewer 
economic resources to shoulder the increased distances and time costs TRAP laws impose 
on them, such fewer resources also make bringing a lawsuit—a process that is both 
expensive and time-consuming—more difficult. Third-party standing for providers is 
therefore critical in providing these women with a legal voice when societal barriers have 
 
104 Molly Redden & Edward Helmore, Norma Mccorvey, 'Roe' in Roe v. Wade Case Legalizing Abortion, 
Dies Aged 69, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 18, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/feb/18/norma-
mccorvey-roe-v-wade-abortion-case-supreme-court. 
105 June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Kliebert, 250 F.Supp.3d 27, 35 (M.D. La. 2017). 
106 Id. 




NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY  [2021 
 
 228 
realistically stripped them of one, allowing cases to come forward that would otherwise be 
impossible. 
Women who face barriers to accessing legal abortion may be more likely to turn to 
self-induced abortions.111 Accordingly, the removal of third-party standing for providers, 
and the subsequent barrier this will place in the path of women seeking abortion, will place 
the health and well-being of already vulnerable women in severe danger, exposing them to 
the possibility of death encountered before Roe.112 In regions of the world where abortion 
is illegal, botched abortions cause about 8%-11% of all maternal deaths; in Brazil alone, 
where abortion is unlawful, approximately 200 women die due to abortion complications 
each year.113 Contrary to Louisiana’s argument in June Medical, self-induced botched 
abortions are direct evidence of a “hindrance” to women seeking abortions representing 
themselves.114  Women who experience health complications due to unplanned 
pregnancies, both mentally and physically, are clearly hindered from pursuing timely legal 
action. 
In addition, the sheer number of women who seek abortions in the United States 
renders Louisiana’s June Medical argument that there is no hindrance to legal 
representation invalid. Studies suggest that each year, more than six million American 
women become pregnant, and almost half of those pregnancies are unintentional.115 Hence, 
nearly half of all American women will face an unintended pregnancy at some point in 
their lives, amounting to nearly three million unintentional pregnancies a year.116 If 
providers are stripped of third-party standing, as Louisiana wishes them to be, three million 
women each year will be vulnerable to having their choices restricted in some manner, 
such as an inability to have an abortion or a delay in procuring the procedure.117 These 
numbers are so large that any argument that no hindrance exists, such as the availability of 
legal representation, is not only ignorant but dangerous.  
Also, from a practical standpoint, abortion is a time-sensitive procedure. Forcing 
women to bring challenges against abortion restrictions such as Act 620 given the length 
of legal cases, which often span years, substantially hinders women’s ability to bring such 
cases because their pregnancy will likely be over by the time the case goes to court. 
Knowing that these challenges will have no benefit for themselves in their particular 
pregnancy, women may be less likely to file lawsuits, allowing unconstitutional abortion 
restrictions to continue without pushback.  
Lastly, abortion providers are effective advocates for women. While third-party 
standing has a complex and inconsistent history, the majority of decisions place “special 
importance” on whether the litigant will be an “effective advocate” for the third party’s 
rights.118 In this regard, courts have repeatedly found abortion providers to be effective 
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advocates for women. Abortion providers understand the impact of abortion regulations on 
patients on an unparalleled level because these regulations impact their daily work. 
Abortion providers meet with these women, perform procedures the women seek, and 
understand the harm that results when women are denied an extremely safe procedure that 
they as patients decided was the best choice for them. Providers also have access to 
resources patients do not, allowing them to advocate for women who are often unable to 
advocate for themselves. Not only will stripping providers of third-party standing hinder 
women’s access to abortion, it will take away the ability to bring cases on behalf of these 
women by the very individuals best suited to do so. 
III. IMPLICATIONS AND WAY FORWARD 
Though Louisiana’s arguments for denying abortion providers third-party standing 
holds no merit, the hostility toward reproductive rights in today’s political climate may 
overcome the years of precedent upholding third-party standing in these cases. The third-
party standing question posed by June Medical has the potential to devastate reproductive 
rights quietly. Abortion cases and outcomes are debated and subjected to public attention, 
yet the legal mechanisms through which these cases emerge are often unacknowledged. 
The public hears about these cases and discusses them, but June Medical threatens a future 
filled with near silence. This will be a future in which hearing about an abortion case will 
be a rarity. And, frighteningly, this silence may be perceived as improvement, showing that 
things have gotten better. A future without third-party standing for abortion providers will 
be a future of silent suffering, one where the reasons for the silence will be unclear and the 
communication of the suffering nearly impossible.  
Perhaps then, the only remedy is to speak—to acknowledge the legal mechanisms 
such as standing that allow for cases to exist, to bring attention to these mechanisms, and 
to recognize that the right to abortion is far more nuanced than agreeing or disagreeing with 
Roe. The only remedy to abortion stigma is speech: speech that allows women to 
understand that they are not alone, normalizes abortion as a common medical procedure, 
pushes back against the vilification of abortion providers, and allows for the nuances 
underlying the right to abortion to be heard and fought for, as opposed to buried under the 
weight of silence and shame. For women most affected by abortion restrictions, the best 
opportunity to have this speech heard in the legal arena is through providers. With third-
party status, providers hold the ability to speak on behalf of these women, preventing their 
voices, their health, and their humanity from being muted by a hostile society. 
IV. JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES HOLDING 
On June 29, 2020, the Supreme Court issued its opinion on June Medical Services 
L.L.C. v. Russo.119 In a 5-4 decision, the Court found Act 620 to be unconstitutional, 
agreeing with the District Court’s findings that the regulation posed an “undue burden” and 
placed a “substantial obstacle” in the path of women seeking an abortion.120 The facts in 
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this case, according to the Court, mirrored those made in Whole Women’s Health in “every 
relevant aspect,” and as such “[required] the same result.”121  
Addressing the State’s third-party standing challenge, the Court took issue with the 
State’s failure to mention its objection to third-party standing for abortion providers until 
it had filed its cross-petition, which was more than five years after it had argued that the 
plaintiffs’ standing was “beyond question.”122 As such, the State's “unmistakable 
concession” of standing barred consideration of the issue in the opinion.123 Further, even 
in the absence of this issue, the Court asserted that it had “long permitted” abortion 
providers to invoke the rights of their “actual or potential patients” in challenging abortion 
regulations.124 In cases where the enforcement of the regulation against the litigant would 
indirectly harm third parties, the Court has generally permitted plaintiffs to assert third-
party rights, as they are the “obvious claimant” and “the least awkward challenger” 
impacted by the regulation.125  
The Court found that the case in question “lies at the intersection of these two lines 
of precedent.” Firstly, the plaintiffs are providers challenging a law that “regulates their 
conduct.”126 Secondly, because they must actually apply and maintain admitting privileges, 
plaintiffs are “far better positioned than their patients to address the burdens of 
compliance,” making them the most obvious claimants in the case.127 The plurality, 
addressing the dissent’s assertion that this case was different given that the plaintiffs 
challenged a law enacted to “protect the women whose rights they are asserting,” found 
that this is a “common feature” of cases in which the Court had found third-party standing. 
Citing cases such as Akron and Doe, the plurality asserted that this was far from the first 
abortion case to address provider standing to challenge regulations supposedly meant to 
protect women.128 As such, the State’s challenge to the plaintiffs’ standing was 
foreclosed.129 
CONCLUSION 
June Medical involves the Unsafe Abortion Protection Act (Act 620). Act 620 
requires abortion providers in Louisiana to have admitting privileges at a hospital within 
thirty miles of where the providers perform abortions, and has decreased the number of 
abortion clinics in Louisiana from six to three, severely impacting women’s access to 
abortion services in the state.130 In addition to the admitting privileges issue in the case, 
Louisiana filed a cross-petition challenging the entitlement of the plaintiff-providers to 
third-party standing in bringing suit, arguing that abortion providers do not meet the 
requirements of third-party standing because their interests are at odds with those of 
patients, they lack a traditional doctor-patient relationship, and there is no hindrance to the 
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ability of third-parties, in this case women seeking abortions, to bring suit on their own 
behalf.131  
Louisiana’s arguments, however, lack merit, as they ignore a long line of precedent 
that recognizes third-party standing of abortion providers challenging health and safety 
regulations, as well as the well-documented danger of TRAP laws to women’s health. In 
addition, Louisiana’s rationale rests on inaccurate assumptions about the doctor-patient 
dynamic, disregarding the commitment of abortion providers to their patients, and ignores 
the very real and dangerous hindrance in the path of women seeking to file lawsuits on 
their own behalf in cases involving abortion restrictions. 
While the Court’s ruling in June Medical demonstrates a hopeful commitment to 
precedent regarding reproductive rights, with the recent appointment of Amy Coney 
Barrett to the Supreme Court, and ongoing anti-choice efforts across the country, the future 
of reproductive rights remains in jeopardy. Threats to reproductive rights are dangerous 
attacks on autonomy. As Justice Ginsburg stated in her 1993 Senate confirmation hearings, 
“The decision whether or not to bear a child is central to a woman’s life, to her well-
being and dignity . . . When government controls that decision for her, she is being 
treated as less than a fully adult human responsible for her own choices.”132 
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